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SECTION 542(c) OF THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF
1978 AND SECTION 4-303 OF THE UCC: A LESS THAN
PERFECT FIT?
by
JOHN P. FINAN*
The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) 4-303 addresses two areas where
the UCC and the Bankruptcy Code intersect. The first relates to the vulnera-
bility of drawee banks that honor checks after their customer has taken bank-
ruptcy (has filed a voluntary petition or is the defendant in an involuntary
case); the second relates to the timing of transfers made by check under 547 of
the Bankruptcy Code (the preference section). In both areas there is a less than
perfect fit between the Bankruptcy Code and UCC 4-303. The first area poses
problems for practitioners whose clients have received notice of bankruptcy in
situations where UCC 4-303 clearly provides protection but where Bankruptcy
Code 542(c), at least arguably, does not. The second area involves the timing of
a transfer by check. The majority of courts equate transfer with honor which is
generally correct since honor generally is the time after which a creditor of the
depositor cannot garnishee funds in the depositor's account. However
sometimes, as explained below, priority contests between holders who present
checks and garnishing creditors are not determined at the time of honor under
UCC 4-303. A minority of courts simply ignore the priority rules of UCC
4-303 and hold that the transfer takes place when the check is honored. (Note:
547(e) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 makes the priority rules of
applicable non-bankruptcy law determinative of the issue of timing.) A
compromise position equates transfer and issue if, but only if, honor is within
ten days of issuance.
VULNERABILITY OF DRAWEE BANKS
The first problem involves Bankruptcy Code 542(c) which, according to
its legislative history, has codified Bank of Main v. England. Section 542(c) of
the Bankruptcy Code reads:
except as provided in 362 (a) (7) of this title, an entity that has neither ac-
tual notice nor actual knowledge of the commencement of the case con-
cerning the debtor' may transfer property of the estate, or pay a debt ow-
ing to the debtor, in good faith and other than in the manner specified in
subsection (d) of this section, to an entity other than the trustee, with the
same effect as the entity making such a transfer or payment as if the case
under this title concerning the debtor had been commenced.
*Professor of Law, The University of Akron School of Law, Akron, Ohio.
SI I U.S.C. 547 (1982). "Debtor means person ... concerning which a case under this title has been com-
menced"; the term "bankrupt" is not used in the Bankruptcy Code to describe a debtor.
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UCC 4-303 provides in part:
[A] ... notice [of bankruptcy] ... comes too late to... terminate, suspend
or modify [the bank's right or duty to pay an item or to charge it's
customer's account for the item] if the ... notice ... is received or served
and a reasonable time for the bank to act thereon expires . . . after the
bank has done any of the following:
(a) accepted or certified the item (UCC 4-303(1) (a));
(b) paid the item in cash (UCC 4-303(1) (b));
(c) become accountable for the item under subsections 1(b), 1(c), or 1(d) of
UCC 4-213 or 4-302 dealing with the payor bank's responsibility for
late return of items (UCC 4-303(1) (c), (d) clause one, and (e) clause
one);
(d) "otherwise has evidenced by examination of such indicated account
and by action its decision to pay the item" (UCC) 4-303(1) (d) clause
two).
Cursory examination of sections of the UCC and Bankruptcy Code
reveals that each addresses an act 2 by the drawee bank, notice to the drawee
bank of bankruptcy, and a legal detriment to the bank if it does not act prior to
notice (or with respect to UCC 4-303 within a reasonable time after receipt of
notice of bankruptcy). Complete harmony requires that the act by the bank,
the notice, and the legal detriment described in one statute be the same as
those described in the other. Such is not the case. To be sure, there is a great
deal of overlap without which one could not compare, or even contrast, the
two sections. The overlap is not complete however and, to the extent of dif-
ference, there is an imperfect fit. The apparent harmony and parallelism, seen
in the highly abstract description above, vanishes when one descends to the
concrete in all three instances: act, notice and legal detriment. Since the Bank
of Marin case, was, according to the legislative history, codified in 542(c) of the
Bankruptcy Code, a brief summary of the Marin case is a necessary step in
understanding the contrast between Bankruptcy Code 542(c) and UCC 4-303.
In Marin, the bank paid checks of a depositor drawn before bankruptcy
but presented after a voluntary petition had been filed. The question was
whether the drawee bank was liable to the trustee for the amount of the checks
paid although the bank had neither knowledge nor notice of the bankruptcy
proceeding. The court held that the drawee bank was not liable, although the
literal language of the Act yielded victory to the bankruptcy trustee. Accord-
ing to the court, "it would be inequitable to hold liable a drawee who pays
checks of the bankrupt duly drawn but presented after bankruptcy, where no
actual revocation of its authority has been made and it has no notice or knowl-
'"Act" as used herein includes a "non act" that occurs upon the expiration of the time limits of UCC § 4-302
or the failure to revoke a provisional settlement in a timely manner under UCC 4-213(1)(d).
[Vol. 20:2
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edge of the bankruptcy."3 The court stated that "the kind of notice required is
one reasonably calculated under all the circumstances to apprise the interested
party of the pendency of the action." According to the court, prior to such no-
tice the trustee acquires no rights in the checking account greater than the
bankrupt himself. Marin states, "absent revocation by the drawer or his trustee
or absent knowledge or notice of the bankruptcy by the bank, the contract be-
tween the bank and the drawer remains unaffected by the bankruptcy, and the
right and duty of the bank to pay duly presented checks remain as before."5
Although Marin has been codified in 542(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, the
protection afforded by that case may not be limited to the protection afforded
by 542(c) of the Bankruptcy Code. In In re Smith Corset Shops,' the court
states "whether or not Section 542(c) is technically applicable, it is a powerful
indication of congressional acceptance of the principle set out in Bank of
Marin. "Collier on Bankruptcy states: "It remains to be seen whether legisla-
tion alone can counteract the possible far-reaching effects of the Bank of
Marin decision."' Thus, one can argue that in determining the scope of 542(c)
the rationale of Marin, the equitable principle of not holding a person liable
who acts with neither notice nor knowledge of bankruptcy, is an important in-
dicia of legislative intent. The argument may cut both ways just as a court may
expand the scope of 542(c) to do equity, it may contract it when equitable prin-
ciples are absent.
A drawee bank in circumstances such as Marin (a very common cir-
cumstance) is protected by UCC 4-303 if it does an act (pays, certifies, becomes
accountable, or sight posts8) prior to the expiration of a reasonable time for the
bank to act on the notice of bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy Code speaks of dif-
ferent acts. It protects the following: "Transferring property of the estate or
paying a debt owing to the debtor." 9 The question is, do the acts, as specified in
the Bankruptcy Code, 0 encompass all of the acts listed in UCC 4-303? These
acts will be considered in the following order: payment in cash, certification,
accountability, and sight posting.
Payment in Cash
This presents the easiest situation. The property of the estate to which the
'Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S. 99, (1966); H.R. REP. No. 95-989, 95th Cong. 2d. Sess. 84 (1978).
'Id. The Court cited Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 389 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
'Id. at 102.
6696 F. 2d 971, 977 (Ist Cir. 1982)
'4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 542.05 (1979).
'Sight post is a shortened form of the act more fully described by the language "or otherwise has evidenced
by examination of such indicated account and by action its decision to pay the item." UCC § 4-303(1)(d)
(1978).
'11 U.S.C. § 546(c) (1982).
I"Marin. 385 U.S. at 103.
Fall, 19861
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bankruptcy trustee succeeds under 541 is a chose in action: namely, the
depositor-debtor's claim against the drawee bank. Technically, a bank which
pays an item in cash pays with its own funds and has not transferred property
of the estate; technically, the trustee's claim is not that the bank has trans-
ferred property of the estate but rather that the bank has not, by paying the
holder, discharged its obligation to the trustee, i.e., the obligation which
became part of the estate when the petition in bankruptcy was filed. This argu-
ment is foreclosed by Marin, in that the bank is discharged if it pays the holder
prior to receipt of notice. But how is Marin codified by 546(c)? The bank does
not transfer property of the estate when it pays the holder in cash; rather, the
bankruptcy estate is diminished when the bank successfully pleads discharge of
its obligation to the trustee because of such payment. The successful plea is
neither the transfer of property of the estate nor the payment of the debt owing
to the debtor." Nevertheless, the legislative history makes it clear that the bank
is protected, 2 although the language used in 542(c) of the Bankruptcy Code is
less than perfect in achieving that result.
Certification.
UCC 4-303 provides that notice of bankruptcy is untimely unless the
bank has had a reasonable time to act thereon prior to acceptance or certifica-
tion.'3 No further reference will be made to acceptance since "certification of a
check is acceptance."'" Certification of a check is the act which grants protec-
tion if performed within a reasonable time after receipt of notice. 5 Is certifica-
tion an act which offers protection under 542(c)?; i.e., is it the transfer of prop-
erty of the estate or paying a debt owing to the debtor? It surely is not the latter
and, unless it is the former, the policy of the Marin case to protect drawee
banks from double liability will be frustrated. Consequently, to harmonize the
rationale of 542(c) with its language, one must conclude that certifying a check
of a drawee who has taken bankruptcy is the transfer of property of the estate
by the drawee bank. The term "transfer" is defined broadly in 101-48 of the
Bankruptcy Code as follows: "transfer means every mode, direct or indirect,
absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing or parting with
property or with an interest in property including retention of title as a security
interest and foreclosure of the debt as equity of redemption."'1 6 Despite the
breadth of the quoted definition, it is difficult to find a transfer of the property
" 11 U.S.C. § 546(c). But see 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 542.04 (1979) "A drawee bank obviously fell
within the express language of clause (2) of former 70(d) when it honored a check of its insolvent depositor
because it was paying an undebtedness (bank and depositor are debtor and creditor) and delivering property
of the debtor upon the order of the debtor (his check).
"Otherwise Marin, would not be codified.
13UCC § 3-410(1) (1978). Acceptance is the drawee's signed engagement to honor the draft as presented.
lIUCC § 3-411 (1978).
11UCC § 4-303(l)(a) (1978).
"611 U.S.C.A. § 101-48 (West Supp. 1986).
[Vol. 20:2
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of the estate in the drawee's certification of a check. 7 Nevertheless, that dif-
ficulty must be surmounted if double liability is to be avoided; otherwise, the
drawee bank becomes liable to the holder by certifying a check and, unless pro-
tected by Bankruptcy Code 542(c), is also liable to the bankruptcy trustee.' 8
Accountability.
There are two types of accountability referenced in UCC 4-303. The first
is accountability based on final payment of an item under UCC 4-213(1). That
section reads in part:
(1) An item is finally paid by a payor bank when the bank has done any of
the following, whichever happens first:...
(b) settled for the item without reserving a right to revoke the settlement
and without having such right under statute, clearing house rule or agree-
ment; or
(c) completed the process of posting the item to the indicated account of
the drawer, maker or other person to be charged therewith; or
(d) made a provisional settlement for the item and failed to revoke the set-
tlement in the time and manner permitted by statute, clearing house rule
or agreement.
Upon a final payment under subparagraphs (b), (c) or (d) the payor bank
shall be accountable for the amount of the item. 19
According to UCC 4-303, final payment by accountability constitutes an act
protecting the bank."
The second type of accountability is referenced in UCC 4-303, namely ac-
countability under 4-302 dealing with the payor bank's responsibility for late
return of items."
Does either type of accountability - accountability upon final payment
under UCC 4-213(1) or accountability for tardiness under UCC 4-302 -
amount to a transfer of property of the estate or the paying of a debt owing to
the debtor within the meaning of 542(c)? Taking final payment first, it should
be noted that payment may not be equated with remittance. Comment 2 to
UCC 4-213 reads:
If an item being collected moves through several states, e.g., is deposited
for collection in California, moves through two or three California banks
"The certification obtained by the payee completes the transfer from the drawer to the payee but the com-
pleted transfer is the transfer of the drawer's claim against the drawee bank, not a transfer by the bank. May
one conclude that an act by the bank which completes the transfer of the drawer's claim, is a transfer of the
property of the estate by the bank? If so, then Matin is codified and -the difficulty is surmounted.
IlUCC § 3-413 (1978).
"1UCC § 4-213(l) (1978).
'*UCC § 4-303, subsection (1)(b), (l)(c) clause 1, and (1)(e) clause I.
2iUCC § 4-303(l)(e).
Fall, 19861
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to the Federal Reserve Bank or San Francisco to the Federal Reserve
Bank of Boston, to a payor bank in Maine, the collection process involves
the eastward journey of the item from California to Maine and the
westward journey of the proceeds from Maine to California. Subsection
(1) adopts the basic policy that final payment occurs at some point in the
processing of the item by the payor bank. This policy recognizes that final
payment does not take place, in such hypothetical case, on the journey of
the item eastward. It also adopts view that neither does final payment oc-
cur on the journey westward because what in fact is journeying westward
is the proceeds of the item. Because the true tests of final payment are the
same in all cases and to avoid the confusion resulting from variable stan-
dards, the rule basing final payment exclusively on action of the payor
bank is not affected by whether payment is made by a remittance draft or
whether such draft is itself paid. Consequently, subsection (1) rejects those
cases which base time of payment of the item in remittance cases on
whether the remittance draft was accepted by the presenting bank."
The language of UCC 4-213(1) and the just-quoted comment thereto
establish that payment by becoming accountable involves not the discharge of
a bank's obligation by remittance, but imposition of an obligation (account-
ability) on the bank. Yet, unless such imposition is equated either with the
transfer of property of the estate or with the payment of a debt owing to the
debtor, the policy of 542(c) to avoid double liability will be frustrated. It is sub-
mitted that, despite the infelicity of language, such accountability by payment
involves a transfer of property of the estate or the payment of a debt owing to
the estate within the meaning of 542(c) of the Bankruptcy Code;" otherwise
there would be double liability, the result foreclosed by Marin. The same argu-
ment applies with equal force to accountability based upon late return of items
under UCC 4-303. However, the policy of 542(c) is based upon notions of
fairness enunciated in Marin.24 It is arguable that a bank which becomes ac-
countable, not because of its act in honoring a check but because of its failure
to act in a timely fashion, does not come within the scope of the protection pro-
vided by Marin and codified in 542(c) of the Bankruptcy Code. Marin is based
on equitable principles of fairness; might not a court hold that the equities do
not extend to one who lacks clean hands because of delay?
Sight Posting.
The argument that it strains language to treat payment in cash, certifica-
tion of a check, or accountability, as a transfer of property of the estate is
perhaps a quibble. Under section 70 of the Bankruptcy Act, the predecessor of
22UCC § 4-213, Comment 2 (1978).
23Accountability serves the same function as certification as far as the problem being discussed is concerned
in that it completes the transfer of the drawer's claim against the bank to the payee. See footnote 15 supra
and accompanying text for a suggested reconciliation of the policy of 542(c) and its language.
24Marin, 385 U.S. at 99.
[Vol. 20:2
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section 541, trustees were vested by operation of law with the title of the
bankrupt as of the date of filing of the petition initiating a proceeding.
Technically, the trustee was vested with title to a claim against the drawee
bank, not with title to any funds therein. Nevertheless, a transfer by the bank
to a holder who subsequently sought discharge of the debt owing to the trustee
was not only treated as a transfer of property, it was treated as a transfer that
was not protected by 70(d) of the Bankruptcy Act. 5 Section 542(c) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code merely uses the terminology of the Act in treating a transfer of
the bank's own funds as a transfer of property of the estate whenever the bank
successfully claims discharge of its obligation to the estate because of the
transfer. 6 Thus, despite infelicitous drafting, there is little doubt that a bank is
protected if 1) it pays a check in cash, 2) certifies the check, or 3) becomes ac-
countable under either UCC 4-213(1) or UCC 4-303. More than a quibble is in-
volved, however, with respect to sight posting, a phenomenon described in the
Comments to UCC 4-303 as follows:
The sixth event conferring priority is stated by the language "or otherwise
has evidenced by examination of such indicated account and by action its
decision to pay the item." This general 'omnibus' language is necessary to
pick up other possible types of action impossible to specify particularly but
where the bank has examined the account to see if there are sufficient
funds and has taken some action indicating an intention to pay. An exam-
ple is what has sometimes been called 'sight posting' where the bookkeep-
er examines the account and makes a decision to pay but postpones
posting.27
The effect of posting under the "omnibus" language was addressed in the
Yandell case.28 On July 29 a drawee bank received checks. The bookkeeper ex-
amined them and the drawer's account and made a penciled note to indicate a
commitment to pay. The bookkeeper also stamped and initialed the checks.
211d. In Matin, both the majority and the dissenting opinion are in agreement on that score as far as the plain
meaning of the Act is concerned. The majority avoided the plain meaning in order to do equity. See also.
KING & COOK. CREDITORS RIGHTS, DEBTORS' PROTECTION (1980); BANKRUPTCY. CASES AND MATERIALS,
MATHEW BENDER (1985), wherein the authors commentin on the Marin case state, "that a literal reading of
the Act could have led to the opposite conclusion."
2 6Marin, 385 U.S. at 102-03. The Marin case states "it is therefore argued with force that payment by the
drawee of a drawer bankrupt's checks after the date of filing is a 'transfer' within the meaning of § 70(d)(5).
Yet we do not read the statutory words with ease of a computer. There is an overriding consideration that
equitable principles govern the exercise of bankruptcy jurisdiction." If the Court did not regard honor as a
transfer of property of the bankrupt, there would have been no need to resort to equitable principles to avoid
the literal meaning of § 70(d)(5). Subsequently, the Court suggests that equity can be achieved and the policy
of the Act can be served by treating the transfer to the payee as a voidable preference. The Court states,
"The payee is a creditor of the bankrupt, and to make him reimburse the trustee is only to deprive him of
preferential treatment and to restore him to the category of a general creditor. To permit the trustee under
these circumstances to obtain recovery only against the party that benefitted from the transaction is to do
equity." Presumably the transfer of property which constitutes the preference is the transfer of the chose in
action, the drawer's claim against the drawee bank, not the transfer of the bank's property to the payee.
27UCC § 4-303 Comment 3.
nYandell v. White City Amusement Park, Inc., 232 F. Supp. 582, (D. Mass. 1964).
Fall, 19861
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However, they were not machine posted until August 2. On August 1, a writ
of garnishment was served on the bank. The court held the writ untimely
under 4-303(1) (d), (the omnibus provision). A writ of garnishment is one of the
"four legals" and is treated by UCC 4-303 in a manner parallel to a notice of
bankruptcy thereunder.
Consider a case where, instead of a writ of garnishment, a notice of
bankruptcy is received between the time that a bank has sight posted and the
time that it has completed the process of posting or has otherwise become ac-
countable. Assume further that prior to accountability the bank had a
reasonable time to act on the notice of bankruptcy. Here the UCC, by its plain
language and under the authority of Yandell," protects a bank which pays the
holder. Does the Bankruptcy Code also protect the bank from liability to the
estate? Remember that, once a petition in bankruptcy is filed, the chose in ac-
tion, the debtor's claim agains the bank, becomes part of the estate created by
section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code. Has the bank discharged its liability to
the estate if, after sight posting but before accountability, it receives a notice of
bankruptcy? The rationale of the Marin case3° suggests a negative answer since
the bank is not subject to double liability if it pays the trustee and dishonors
the check presented by the holder. Since 542(c) of the Bankruptcy Code,
according to its legislative history, codifies the Marin case and Marin in turn is
based on the equitable principle of preventing double liability to the holder
whenever notice of bankruptcy comes after accountability, it seems to follow
that 542(c) affords no protection whatsoever to a bank which honors a check
presented by a holder under the circumstances being discussed. The language
of 542(c) supports this conclusion for; whatever may be said for the proposition
that payment in cash, certification of a check, or accountability, amounts to a
transfer of property of the estate, it seems clear that sight posting does not
amount to such a transfer." Sight posting certainly does not amount to the
paying of a debt owing to the debtor. Consequently there is a disparity between
the protection provided by UCC 4-303 and that provided by 542(c) which
could be a trap for the unwary bank which consults only the Uniform Com-
mercial Code and not the Bankruptcy Code.
The Notice Requirements Compared
As noted above, 542(c) of the Bankruptcy Code requires that the bank act
prior to actual notice in order to gain protection. The UCC protection has a
similar requirement; however, there is not complete harmony. The UCC pro-
tects the bank if the notice is "received or served" and a reasonable time for the
bank to act thereon expires after the bank has done any of the acts catalogued
29id.
"See Supra note 3.
"It does not fit the rationale offered in footnote 15, supra, because it does not complete the transfer of the
drawer's claim against the bank to the trustee.
[Vol. 20:2
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above. 542(c) of the Bankruptcy Code does not expressly afford a bank a
reasonable time to act on a notice received or served. Whether courts will read
a reasonable time period into the language used in 542(c) remains to be seen.
Apart from the discrepancy just noted, there is a possible discrepancy be-
tween the definition of "notice" as used in the UCC and "actual notice" as used
in 542(c) of the Bankruptcy Code. (The Bankruptcy Code is arguably redun-
dant in referring to both actual notice and actual knowledge for, presumably,
whenever there is actual knowledge there is actual notice. In the interest of
brevity, only actual notice will be referred to hereafter with the understanding
that actual notice refers, inter alia, to actual knowledge). What is the relation-
ship between "actual notice," as used in 542(c), and notice as used in UCC
4-303? The UCC provides that a person has notice of a fact when he has
received a notice or notification of it." Person is defined to include an organ-
ization. 3 However, under UCC 1-201(27) notice received by an organization is
not immediately effective. UCC 1-201(27) reads:
(27) Notice, knowledge or a notice of notification received by an organiza-
tion is effective for a particular transaction from the time when it is
brought to the attention of the individual conducting that transaction,
and in any event from the time when it would have been brought to his at-
tention if the organization had exercised due diligence. An organization
exercises due diligence if it maintains reasonable routines for com-
municating significant information to the person conducting the transac-
tion and there is reasonable compliance with the routines. Due diligence
does not require an individual acting for the organization to communicate
information unless such communication is part of his regular duties or
unless he has reason to know of the transaction and that the transaction
would be materially affected by the information.3"
UCC 4-303(1) speaks of the time a notice is received and a reasonable time
for the bank to act thereon expires. Presumably, however, the bank has a
reasonable time, not from the receipt of notice, but from its effectiveness under
UCC 1-201(27). Because of the flexibility of the term "reasonable" this is a con-
struction easily reached and seems to accord with the policy of UCC 4-303(1).
In order to compare the time at which a reasonable time expires with ac-
tual notice under the Bankruptcy Code 542(c), it is necessary to consider the
meaning of the term "actual notice" as used in that subsection. According to
Osborn on Mortgages, "[wihen it comes to determining what constitutes
'notice,' there has been a great confusion and disagreement both as to analysis
and terminology of the subject."" He describes the clear areas, i.e. constructive
12UCC § 1-201 (25) (1978).
'
3UCC § 1-201 (30) (1978).
-UCC § 1-201 (27) (1978).
11G. OSBORN. OSBORN ON MORTGAGES 519 (1951).
Fall, 19861
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notice - the knowledge with which one is charged by reason of recordation -
and the other extreme, full actual knowledge of the ultimate fact of a hostile
conveyance. According to him, between these two extremes there is inquiry
notice and rationcination notice. One has inquiry notice if he "does not know a
fact affecting his legal position [but] nevertheless [is] conscious of other facts so
strongly indicating the existence of the ultimate fact that a man of ordinary
prudence would inquire concerning it or conduct his business as though it ex-
isted." 6 As for actual notice, he states, "some courts, when faced with this
question, have held that actual notice and actual knowledge mean the same
thing."37 Clearly that cannot be the case under 542(c) of the Bankruptcy Code
since it uses both terms, obviously indicating that there is a difference between
them. Osborn continues,
[oithers have extended it to include what should be known, either because
a reasonable man would draw the inference that it did exist by logical
deduction, or from general human experience, or from knowledge of
other facts in his possession, or else, as a man of ordinary prudence, he
would find out by additional inquiry or conduct his affairs on the assump-
tion that it existed. It should be observed that while in such a case the
knowledge of the facts upon which the duty of inquiry is based must ac-
tually be brought home, the knowledge of the ultimate fact is then at-
tributed to him on a reasonable man standard of ratiocination and pru-
dent conduct regardless of whether the particular individual actually so
thought or would have acted. In other words, when knowledge of certain
facts have been established the person will be treated, by a rule of substan-
tive law, as though he had knowledge of the ultimate fact that affects his
rights regardless of whether in fact, he did or did not have such
knowledge. Since, however, actual knowledge of the inquiry stimulating
fact must be brought home, there is justification for classifying such
notice as actual, even though the ultimate knowledge is ascribed to him
by operation of a rule of substantive law ... still others, however, have
called notice of this sort 'constructive.' If, in addition, knowledge of the
facts upon which the duty is grounded is attributed to the individual
because he, as a reasonable person, would, or should, have discovered
them, without proof that in fact he had done so, it would be straining the
natural meaning of the term 'actual notice' to say it covered such a case.
Here the legal consequences of actual knowledge of the ultimate fact
become operative upon establishing certain facts without showing that
the person whose rights are affected actually knew the facts established or
the ultimate facts.3 8
"Id. at 519.
"Id. at 520.
"Id. at 520-21.
[Vol. 20:2
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He summarizes,
"[Tihe law, by applying an artificial, reasonable man standard, first says
that he is charged with knowing the existence of certain facts regardless of
whether he does or does not know them; and then, by applying the same
standard, charges him with further knowledge which he ought to have ac-
quired in consequence of his attributed knowledge of the first fact. Such a
situation certainly should not be classified as 'actual notice."' 39
Applying Osborn's terminology one might conclude that a person has actual
notice, as the term is used in 542(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, if he has actual
knowledge of the ultimate fact that a bankruptcy petition has been filed, or he
has actual knowledge of some facts which lead to that conclusion, either by in-
quiry or ratiocination. Thus, the following would be excluded from the defini-
tion of "actual notice" in the Bankruptcy Act: 1) constructive notice such as
record notice and 2) both inquiry and ratiocination notice when the basic fact
is not actually known.4°
The next question is whether or not inquiry notice is included within the
term actual notice. The Uniform Commercial Code, 1-201(25), reads in part, "a
person has notice of a fact when ... (c) from all the facts and circumstances
known4' to him at the time in question he has reason to know that it exists."
The Uniform Commercial Code has adopted ratiocination notice, or what
might be more aptly called inference notice, and has rejected inquiry notice as
a standard."2 Since even a reasonably prudent person can learn more by inquiry
than by mere thinking or inferring, the inference notice standard charges one
with much less notice than does the inquiry notice standard. Which does the
Bankruptcy Code adopt? There is no definition of notice in section 101, the
definitional section, or in any other section of the Bankruptcy Code. If one
resorts to the general definitions enunciated by Osborn, the Bankruptcy Code
has adopted both inquiry and inference notice. It remains to be seen whether
courts will limit the definition of notice in the Bankruptcy Code to the defini-
tion found in UCC 1-201(25) (c). If they do not, the apparent harmony be-
tween UCC 4-303(1) and Bankruptcy Code 542(c) is at least, in part, illusory
because situations will surely arise where one has inquiry notice of the com-
mencement of the case concerning a debtor, but not inference notice. In such a
case a drawee bank is protected by the Uniform Commercial Code but not by
the Bankruptcy Code.43
The possible mismatch in the definition of notice under the Bankruptcy
" . OSBORN, supra note 35, at 519-21.
'°According to UCC 1-201(25), "A person 'knows' or has 'knowledge' of a fact when he has actual knowledge
of it."
J"Id.
"See E. PETERS. A NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS PRIMER, (2d Ed. 1974).
41t is assumed that if one lacks inference notice under UCC 1-201(25)(c) he or she has not received a notice
or notification of it under UCC 1-201(25)(b), at least not a notification effective under UCC 1-201(27).
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Code and the Uniform Commercial Code coupled with the reasonable time to
act thereon standard of UCC 4-303(1) suggests that in cases where timing is
close, there may be discrepancy between the Uniform Commercial Code and
the Bankruptcy Code.
The Legal Detriment
Thus far discussion has been about the act which must be performed prior
to notice of bankruptcy or a reasonable time to act thereon in order to avoid a
legal detriment. The third issue is, what is the legal detriment? Or, put another
way, what is the legal benefit of timely action? According to Bankruptcy Code
542(c), if one acts timely, the effect of the transfer or payment is the same "as
to the entity making such transfer or payment as if the case under this title
concerning the debtor had not been commenced."" Thus, the drawee bank is
not liable to the estate. What is the legal benefit of timely action under UCC
4-303(1)? According to that subsection, the benefit is this - if the notice of
bankruptcy is untimely, it does not terminate, suspend or modify any rights
the drawee has against the drawer, nor does it terminate, suspend or modify
any duties of the bank owing to the drawer. Conversely, if the notice is timely,
it does terminate, suspend or modify such rights or duties. Presumably, in the
context of bankruptcy, if the notice of bankruptcy is timely the drawee bank
has neither a right nor a duty owing to the drawer to pay the item to the
holder. Since a check is not of itself an assignment,45 it seems to follow that the
bank is subject to an action by the bankruptcy trustee if, but only if, the notice
of bankruptcy is timely,46 and thus the legal detriment is identical under the
Bankruptcy Code and under the Uniform Commercial Code. To be sure, the
language used in the two Codes is not identical, but the legal effects at least
seem to be.
Assignments
The above discussion was based on the assumption that the check in ques-
tion did not constitute an assignment. "A check or other draft does not of itself
operate as an assignment,"47 and usually drawers take no action making a
check an assignment. However, checks do occasionally constitute assignments
and in such cases, banks which honor them are protected, it is submitted, both
by the language of the Bankruptcy Act and the policy underlying Marin,
namely the avoidance of double liability. UCC 4-303, in its list of acts, does not
mention assignments, but presumably that gap is filled by UCC 1-103, which is
captioned "Supplementary General Principles of Law and Equity" and which
reads: "Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles
-I I U.S.C. § 542(c) (1982).
'UCC § 3-409 (1978).
46When the term timely is used, it is assumed that not only has the notice been received on time, but the
bank has had a reasonable time to act thereon.
IIUCC § 3-409(1) (1978).
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of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity
to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress,
coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause shall
supplement its provisions."4
Assume the following hypothetical: A check which constitutes an assign-
ment is drawn prior to bankruptcy but is honored after a petition in bankrupt-
cy has been filed and after the bank has received actual notice of bankruptcy
and has had a reasonable time to act thereon before it honored the check. Is
the bank liable to the trustee for honoring the check? No, for the following
reasons:
An assignment is effective between the parties at the time it is made, i.e.,
at the time the check constituting the assignment is delivered by the drawer to
the payee. At that time, the chose in action, the claim of the drawer against the
bank, ceases to be a claim of the drawer and becomes a claim of the payee.
Thus, under the language of the Bankruptcy Act, property of the estate was
transferred before the drawee bank received actual notice of the commence-
ment of the case and thus the bank is protected by the literal language of
546(c).
What if the bank is not notified of the assignment before it receives notice
of the bankruptcy of its customer/assignor? It is a general rule that, although
an assigment is effective between the parties at the time it is made, 49 the
obligor, i.e. the drawee bank, has the power to discharge itself by paying the
assignor-obligee prior to the time it receives notice of the assignment."
The obligee, of course, is the drawer to whose rights the trustee succeeds
when an estate is created upon the filing of the petition in bankruptcy.
5 1
Presumably, when the drawer takes bankruptcy, this rule provides that, if the
obligor, i.e., the drawee bank, pays the estate created by 541(a), prior to the
time it receives notice of the assignment, it is discharged.5" If so, then a bank
which receives notice of bankruptcy prior to the time it receives notice of the
assignment may pay the estate without incurring liability to the assignee-
holder. The practice point is obvious. A payee, doubtful of the financial solven-
cy of the drawer, should not only insist that the draft be an assignment, but
should also give notice to the drawee bank at the earliest possible time. Enforc-
"UCC § 1-303 (1978).
1L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 902, (1952).
'0Continental Purchasing Co., Inc. v. Van Realte Co., 295 N.Y.S. 867 (N.Y. App. Div. 1937). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 341 (1979).
5111 U.S.C. § 541 (1982).
12L. CORBIN, supra note 49. In such a case, the assignor holds the proceeds of the assigned rights in construc-
tive trust for the assignee. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 341 Comment a. Presumably the
bankruptcy estate, which is comprised of the property of the debtor under § 541 of the Bankruptcy Code,
also holds the proceeds in constructive trust for the payee.
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ing a constructive trust against the estate53 is not an attractive alternative.
What if the bank pays a holder after being notified of bankruptcy but
before it receives notice of the assignment? Here the bank is discharged from
liability. To be sure it had the power to be discharged by paying the estate since
it had not received notice but it is not obliged to exercise that power; its pay-
ment to the payee (or subsequent holder) is not a transfer of property of the
estate. Consequently the bank is not liable.
Discussion of assignments may be largely academic since they are rare.
However, assignments, when made, are generally made when there is doubt
about the solvency of the drawer. Thus, assignments may be less rare in the
bankruptcy context than they are in general. Furthermore, the law regarding
assignment may become more important as lawyer, realizing the advantages
listed above, use them to avoid the dangers of attacks based on the law of
preferences.
TIMING OF CHECK TRANSFERS
The second area to be addressed in this paper is the timing of check
transfers. Timing of such transfers is a difficult problem because it is uncertain
when a check transfer takes place for purposes of section 547 of the Bankrupt-
cy Code. Timing is determined by reading UCC 4-303 together with the timing
formula of 547(e) of the Bankruptcy Code.
The timing formula of the Bankruptcy Code is understandable only if it is
remembered that there are two types of perfection, perfection under 547 of the
Bankruptcy Code (bankruptcy perfection) and perfection under Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC 9-303(1) (UCC perfection); and if it is also
remembered that there are two types of transfer under 547(e)(2) of the
Bankruptcy Code (bankruptcy transfer) and transfer under applicable non-
bankruptcy law between the transferor and the transferee (actual transfer). A
transfer is perfected within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code54 when a
judicial lien creditor, on a simple contract, cannot acquire an interest which is
superior to the interest of the transferee. This point in time will be hereafter
referred to as parity. Under Bankruptcy Code 547(e)(2), if parity is achieved
within ten days after the actual transfer, the bankruptcy transfer takes place at
the time of the actual transfer; otherwise, it takes place at the time parity is
achieved if parity is achieved before the commencement of the case. If parity is
achieved after the commencement of the case, and after the expiration of the
ten day period, then the bankruptcy transfer takes place "immediately before
the date of the filing of the petition."55
The transferee is exposed to risk of avoidance whenever the transfer is
531d.
"411 U.S.C. § 547(e)(1)(B) (1982).
"11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2)(C) (1982).
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postponed to a time after the beginning of the reach-back period (ninety days
for non-insiders; one year for insiders).56 Frequently checks will be issued prior
to the beginning of the reach-back period, but honored after the beginning of
that period. The question then is, when did the bankruptcy transfer take place?
At the time of issue? At the time of honor? Or at some other time? On this
question the cases are in conflict. The majority holds the time of honor; the
minority holds the time of issue; and a compromise position holds the time of
issue provided honor is within ten days therefrom.57 Under the language of
UCC 4-303, the majority seems correct in rejecting the time of issuance
whether or not honor is within ten days thereof because a lien creditor can ob-
tain parity after the date of issuance even if honor is within ten days thereafter.
The ten day grace period would only operate if the issuance of a check con-
stituted an actual transfer of the drawer's claim against the drawee; it does not
unless there is an assignment in which case the ten day period is unnecessary
since transfers take place when the assignment is effective. However, it is not
clear that honor is always the time of tranfer. UCC 4-303 determines when a
writ of garnishment comes too late. Since a garnishing creditor is a lien
creditor, the appropriate test under the Bankruptcy Code provisions discussed
above is, when does the transferee obtain parity with garnishing creditors? Ac-
cording to UCC 4-303, such parity is achieved no later than the time that the
bank has done one of the following acts: paid the item in cash, certified the
check, become accountable under UCC 4-213(1), or 4-303, or sight posted.
Arguably parity is achieved slightly before such time for UCC 4-303(1) pro-
vides that "any ... legal process served upon ... a payor bank . . . comes too
late ... if the legal process is ... served and a reasonable time for the bank to
act thereon expires . . . after the bank has done any of the following""8 acts
enumerated just above. Since calculation of a hypothetical reasonable time
poses practical difficulties in litigation, courts may ignore the reasonable time
language. The following discussion assumes that they will; no case to date has
considered such language.
A bank honors a check59 when it pays it in cash, certifies it, or becomes ac-
countable by finally paying the item under UCC 4-213(1); however, it is doubt-
ful that a bank honors a check either by sight posting or by becoming account-
able under 4-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code. The two acts mentioned in
5611 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4) (1982).
"Hall, Preferences and Setoffs, 2 BANKR. DEVELOPMENTS J. 49.61-62 (1985).
aAfter the reasonable time begins to run, it is no longer possible for a garnishing creditor to obtain parity.
"°"Honor" is not defined. UCC 3-507(I )(a) provides that an instrument is dishonored when: 1) payment or ac-
ceptance is refused, or 2) payment cannot be obtained within the prescribed time, or 3) in case of bank collec-
tions, the instrument is seasonably returned by the midnight deadline. Assuming that honor and dishonor
are contradictories, not contraries, it follows that honor occurs when an instrument is paid or accepted. In
the case of a check, acceptance means certification, UCC 3-411 (I); therefore, honor seems to occur when an
instrument is paid in cash, certified, or there is accountability by final payment under 4-213(l) of the
Uniform Commercial Code. It does not mean accountability because of a lapse of time under 4-302 or ac-
countability when a check is sight posted.
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the last sentence, however, make a writ of garnishment untimely and are al-
most always prior to the time of honor, however defined. Thus honor, al-
though it is a convenient term to signify parity, is not always equivalent
thereto.
It is believed that equating the time of honor with parity is a good rule of
thumb. However, care must be taken to investigate whether some act pre-
scribed by UCC 4-303 occurs before honor. If it does, then parity is achieved
prior to honor. Given the importance of timing in preference litigation, an
analysis which yields an earlier date may be dispositive and certainly is worth
exploring by the transferee-defendant in a preference action.
CONCLUSION
A major task of lawyers involved in Bankruptcy practice is the task of in-
tegrating the Bankruptcy Code with applicable non-bankruptcy law. Frequent-
ly, such law is the UCC. Drafters of the Bankruptcy Code were aware of the
need for harmonization and have been generally successful. However, as
discussed in this article, there are fringe areas where the fit is less than perfect.
This Article addresses one of those fringe areas.
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